Graph Lens Lite is distributed as versioned releases. Security fixes are applied to the latest minor release line; please upgrade before reporting.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.15.x | ✅ |
| < 1.15 | ❌ |
Please do not open public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities.
Report privately through either channel:
- GitHub Security Advisories — use Security → Report a vulnerability on the repository (preferred; keeps disclosure coordinated).
- Email — matthias.ley@delta4.ai with subject
GLL security.
Please include:
- affected version and platform (Windows / Linux / macOS / browser build),
- a description of the issue and its impact,
- reproduction steps or a proof-of-concept,
- any suggested remediation.
We aim to acknowledge reports within 5 business days and to provide a remediation timeline after triage. We will credit reporters in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
Graph Lens Lite has two attack surfaces worth calling out:
-
The desktop app (Electron renderer). The app loads graph data from local JSON and Excel files. Treat loaded files as untrusted input: node, edge, property, and layout names are escaped before being rendered. Reports of injection (HTML/script) via crafted graph files are in scope.
-
The optional ingest service (
server/). When runningnpm run serve:api, an HTTP endpoint accepts pushed graph data. It is authenticated with a bearer token (GLL_API_TOKEN) and binds to loopback (127.0.0.1) by default. If you changeGLL_API_HOSTto0.0.0.0, you are responsible for placing it behind a firewall or reverse proxy. Auth bypass, request-smuggling, path traversal, and denial-of-service against this endpoint are in scope.
Out of scope: issues that require an already-compromised host, social engineering, or attacks that depend on the user disabling the documented loopback default without further protection.