fix(skills): clear two Snyk Fails and harden the network + supply-chain surface

[WaterrrForever]

What

Resolve the security-audit findings surfaced on the published skills (skills.sh — Gen / Socket / Snyk) with no change to any skill's runtime behaviour: two Snyk Fails cleared, plus targeted network / supply-chain hardening. Also folds in one unrelated routing-doc clarification (called out separately below).

Why

The skills.sh audit flagged two skills as Snyk Fail and several as Warn. The two Fails are SAST pattern matches — not runtime-exploitable in our offline render context, but they block adoption in Snyk-gated environments and read badly on an official catalog:

• media-use — an execSync call built from an interpolated command string (CWE-78).
• music-to-video — element.innerHTML = <var> in two frame templates (CWE-79).

The remaining flagged items are real-but-legitimate capabilities (network, subprocess, runtime fetches). Where a capability had an avoidable sharp edge we hardened it; where it's inherent we left it (see Not in scope).

Changes (security)

Skill	Change	Finding addressed
media-use	resolve.test.mjs runs resolve.mjs via execFileSync with an argv array, instead of an interpolated execSync command string	command injection (CWE-78) — Snyk Fail
music-to-video	dynamic innerHTML → setSvg() that sanitizes with a default-deny allow-list (cleanSvg): DOMParser builds the tree, then only inert drawing elements + presentation attributes survive — <script>, 
</svg>

This matters because these paths still accept SVG from variables (vars.leftMark, vars.rightMark, and vars.icon custom SVG), not only from the hardcoded built-ins. So the PR currently changes the shape of the Snyk sink but does not clear the CWE-79 class.

Suggested fixes:

• safest/minimal: only allow the built-in SVG strings/default constants; treat variable-provided custom SVG as text unless explicitly trusted, or
• sanitize the parsed SVG before append with a strict allowlist: drop <script>, <foreignObject>, animation/link/scriptable elements, all on* attributes, and unsafe href/xlink:href/URL-bearing values (javascript:, remote/data URLs unless intentionally allowed). Add a regression test/probe for <script>, onload, and onerror so the security claim is pinned.

Other checks: the GSAP SRI hash matches the CDN bytes, the execFileSync(argv) change is the right CWE-78 fix, and the avatar path/host guards are directionally sound. Rames' manifest/routing notes are worth documenting, but this SVG execution issue is the blocker.

Verdict: REQUEST_CHANGES
— Magi

[WaterrrForever]

Thanks all — pushed 67d95f71 addressing the review.

Re: Magi (requested changes) — blocker fixed, you were right

The prior setSvg() only moved the sink (innerHTML → DOMParser + importNode); it did not sanitize, so active SVG content still executed on insertion. I reproduced your finding and then verified the fix in headless Chrome (same helper, both templates):

	old setSvg (importNode-only)	new setSvg (sanitizing)
fired handlers	["script","onload"]	[]
trusted icon renders	—	✅ svg>path present
danger nodes in output	—	0
on* attrs in output	—	0

setSvg() now runs a default-deny cleanSvg() over the parsed tree before it touches the document: only an allow-list of inert drawing elements (svg/g/path/line/rect/circle/ellipse/defs/linearGradient/stop/text/…) and presentation attributes (d/fill/stroke/viewBox/transform/…) survives. Everything else — <script>, <image>, <use>, <foreignObject>, <a>, <animate>, every on* handler, and href/xlink:href/style — is stripped, including on the root node. Non-SVG / malformed input falls back to textContent. Trusted content (the bundled icon library + default spark/cloud marks) renders byte-identically.

Re: Rames — both notes addressed

1. Routing rewrite — agreed it's not a Snyk fix. Documented explicitly in the PR description under "Also in this PR (non-security)"; it's an isolated commit (docs(skills): clarify product-launch-video vs website-to-video routing).
2. Manifest hash bumps — ran it down: against current main, the manifest bumps only the 9 skills actually modified here; hyperframes-core / slideshow are not among them. What you saw was main's own fix: storyboard-angle review follow-ups (M1 bg-on-clip, B3 slideshow, parser guard, CLI fixes) #1791 (it edited slideshow/SKILL.md) surfaced by merging main into this branch against the pre-fix: storyboard-angle review follow-ups (M1 bg-on-clip, B3 slideshow, parser guard, CLI fixes) #1791 base — not changes from this PR. Generator is deterministic (double-run = identical output). No archaeology needed.

Re: Miga — thanks for the pass.

CI is green again after the re-fix (Format, CodeQL, Skills manifest/tests). Ready for re-review whenever you have a moment.

[jrusso1020]

R2 verification at 67d95f71 — Miao went deeper than my R1's praise of setSvg() and shipped a proper allowlist sanitizer. Concurring with the "real CWE-79 fix" framing in the commit message — my R1 was too lenient.

Where R1 fell short — for the record

My R1 said the original setSvg(DOMParser parse + importNode) was "the right shape" because DOMParser doesn't execute scripts during parse. That's true but insufficient — importNode into the live document then would fire <script> elements, <image href="javascript:…">, on* event handlers, and SMIL <animate> indirect-script paths. Custom user-supplied SVG could smuggle active content past the original setSvg. Real CWE-79 mitigation needs both parse-safety and tree-sanitization.

R2 fix shape — verified proper sanitization

The new setSvg() adds two safeguards beyond R1:

if (!root || root.nodeName.toLowerCase() !== "svg" || doc.getElementsByTagName("parsererror").length) {
  el.textContent = String(markup); return;
}
cleanSvg(root);
el.appendChild(document.importNode(root, true));

1. Parsererror check — catches malformed-XML input that DOMParser silently turns into a <parsererror> document. Without this check the original setSvg would have called nodeName.toLowerCase() !== "svg" correctly but a malformed input that LOOKS like SVG enough to parse-to-svg-root could still slip through.

2. cleanSvg(root) recursive allowlist scrub — runs BEFORE importNode. Strict allowlists:

   • SVG_OK_TAGS: only inert drawing elements (svg/g/path/line/polyline/polygon/rect/circle/ellipse/defs/lineargradient/radialgradient/stop/clippath/title/desc/text/tspan). Notably ABSENT: <script>, <foreignObject>, <image>, <use>, <iframe>, <a>, <animate>, <animateTransform>. Each of those is a known SVG-XSS vector — <foreignObject> can embed HTML, <use href="data:image/svg+xml…"> can pull cross-document content, <animate> SMIL can trigger script-style behavior.
   • SVG_OK_ATTRS: only presentation attributes (viewbox/xmlns/width/height/fill/stroke/d/x/y/cx/cy/r/transform/etc.). Notably ABSENT: all on* handlers, href/xlink:href (no javascript: URL sneaks), style (no CSS-expression smuggling).
   • Recurses depth-first; removes any element not in allowlist, removes any attribute not in allowlist. Text nodes preserved.

Identical sanitizer duplicated across both templates (intro-kinetic-cascade + logo-split-lockup-pulse) — same minor template-duplication note from R1 still applies but each template ships standalone so it's intentional.

Behavior preservation — verified for legitimate input

For the documented use cases (library icons + custom-inline-SVG configs):

• Library icons (ICONS[iconSpec]) — produce simple <svg> markup with <path d="..." fill="..."/> shapes. Every tag + attribute in those library icons IS in the allowlist (svg, path, fill, d, viewbox, width, height, stroke*, transform). Rendering preserved.
• Custom inline SVG (iconSpec.startsWith("<svg")) — for template-config-provided SVGs containing only drawing markup (no script, no foreignObject), all elements/attributes survive the scrub. Active-content elements/attributes get scrubbed (the whole point).
• Non-SVG / malformed input — falls to el.textContent = String(markup). Safe text fallback.

document.importNode(root, true) deep-clone after sanitization preserves the cleaned tree exactly as it'll render.

What remains from my R1

Both my R1 body-vs-diff flags are still in the diff (this R2 commit only touched the SVG sanitizer):

1. skills/hyperframes/SKILL.md +17/-17 routing-rule rewrite — still in the PR, still not mentioned in the body's "Findings addressed" table. Real orchestrator behavior change, not security.
2. Unexpected manifest hashes for hyperframes-core + slideshow — still in skills-manifest.json despite no files in either skill changing. R2 only adjusted music-to-video (which DID change). The two anomalous bumps from R1 persist; worth a one-line explanation in the body.

Both remain non-blocking, just clarity for archaeology.

CI: 31/31 deduped green (59 raw — 28 superseded filtered).

Verdict

R2 cleanly resolves the genuine CWE-79 gap I missed in R1. Concurring with the commit message's "real CWE-79 fix" framing. Still COMMENT (external author, stamp routing through @U08E7PV788Z).

— Jerrai (pr-review)

[miga-heygen]

Re-review at 67d95f7 (was 57cf9c15)

New commit since last review

67d95f7 — fix(skills): sanitize SVG in music-to-video templates (real CWE-79 fix)

This directly addresses the blocking issue from Miguel's review: the previous setSvg() swapped the sink (innerHTML to DOMParser + importNode) but never sanitized the parsed tree, leaving DOM-XSS fully exploitable via crafted SVGs in template variables (vars.icon, leftMark, rightMark).

What changed

Both music-to-video templates (intro-kinetic-cascade and logo-split-lockup-pulse) now run a cleanSvg() sanitizer before any parsed SVG enters the live document. The approach is default-deny with explicit allowlists:

• SVG_OK_TAGS — 18 inert drawing elements (svg, g, path, rect, circle, defs, lineargradient, stop, clippath, text, tspan, etc.). Everything else (<script>, <image>, <use>, <foreignObject>, <a>, <animate>, <set>) is removed.
• SVG_OK_ATTRS — 35 presentation/geometry attributes (d, fill, stroke, viewBox, transform, class, id, etc.). All on* handlers, href, xlink:href, and style are stripped.
• Parse-error guard — doc.getElementsByTagName("parsererror").length check catches malformed SVG and falls back to textContent.
• Non-element, non-text nodes (comments, processing instructions) are also removed.

Verification

The commit message confirms headless Chrome testing:

• Old setSvg fired both onload and <script> payloads
• New setSvg fires neither, while trusted bundled icons render identically

Assessment

The allowlist is well-scoped — covers the full set of drawing primitives the templates actually use (paths, circles, rects, gradients, clip-paths, text) without opening any active-content vectors. The transform attribute is the only one that could theoretically be a concern, but SVG transform is purely geometric (translate/rotate/scale/skew/matrix) — no execution surface there.

One minor observation (non-blocking): the cleanSvg + allowlist definitions are duplicated across both templates. If a third music-to-video template lands, worth extracting to a shared snippet. Not a blocker — these are standalone HTML compositions and the duplication is self-contained.

CI

All required checks pass at this SHA. skills-manifest.json hash bump for music-to-video is consistent.

Verdict: LGTM — the CWE-79 finding is properly resolved. The blocking review feedback has been addressed.

— Miga

[miguel-heygen]

Re-reviewed at 67d95f71; R2 resolves my blocker.

The previous DOMParser + importNode change was parse-safe but not insertion-safe. The new helper now sanitizes before import with a default-deny allowlist: active elements (<script>, <image>, <use>, <foreignObject>, <a>, <animate>), all on* handlers, href / xlink:href, and style are stripped before nodes enter the live document, while inert drawing tags and presentation geometry survive.

I re-ran the headless-Chrome proof against the R2 sanitizer shape: a valid active SVG payload produced data-danger-nodes=0, data-on-attrs=0, data-href-attrs=0, data-style-attrs=0, no execution marker, and preserved the benign <rect>. A trusted gradient/path SVG also still rendered (path=1, stop=1).

The other hardening remains sound: execFileSync(argv) fixes the shell-injection shape, the avatar URL/path guards are defensive, and the GSAP SRI additions are consistent. Rames' routing/body and manifest archaeology notes are now documented/non-blocking.

Approved.
— Magi

[miga-heygen]

Re-review: fix(skills): clear two Snyk Fails and harden the network + supply-chain surface

What changed: Only a merge-forward of main into the branch (8985b3e), with conflicts limited to skills-manifest.json hash entries (auto-generated). No new feature commits, no code changes beyond merge resolution.

Previous concerns — all resolved:

• SVG sanitizer blocker (Magi's CHANGES_REQUESTED) → fixed in 67d95f7 with cleanSvg() default-deny allowlists
• Routing-rule prose rewrite scope → documented in PR body
• Manifest hash bumps → explained as surfaced from main's #1791, verified by double-run

SVG sanitizer re-verified (unchanged since approval):

• 18 inert drawing tags allowlisted; all active-content vectors stripped
• 35 presentation/geometry attributes allowlisted; all on* handlers, href/xlink:href, style stripped
• Root node attributes also scrubbed
• Non-SVG/malformed input falls back to safe textContent

CI: All relevant checks pass (format, file size, CodeQL, skills manifest, skills tests, semantic PR title).

Verdict: Still LGTM — Same state as Magi's approval + clean merge-forward. Ready to merge.

— Miga

[miguel-heygen]

Re-reviewed current head 8985b3e9. The new head is a merge-forward only; the SVG sanitizer fix from 67d95f71 is unchanged, the routing-scope and manifest-hash notes are documented, and required checks are green. I also removed the generated-by footer from the PR body before stamping.

Verdict: APPROVE
Reasoning: Prior blocker is resolved, current delta is metadata/merge-forward only, and CI is clean.